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Apartheid and colonialism left deep imprints on contemporary South African society. 
Nowhere are these more compellingly apparent than in the highly skewed distribution of 
land between whites and blacks. At the beginning of the 1990' s, it was estimated that 12 
million black people lived on only 17.1 million hectares of land, whilst 60,000 white 
commercial farmers occupied 86.2 million hectares. Since democratisation in 1994 
various modes of land redistribution have emerged in South Africa to redistribute 
farmland to previously disadvantaged people. 
In 1994, an African National Congress (ANC)-led government initiated a land 
redistribution programme by offering Settlement/Land Acquisition Grants (SLAG) to 
previously disadvantaged South Africans to purchase formerly white-owned farms on a 
willing buyer-willing seller basis. The aim of SLAG was to redistribute 30 per cent of the 
country's commercial farmland to previously disadvantaged South Africans within five 
years. However, by the end of the first five years less than two per cent of white-owned 
farmland was transferred to previously disadvantaged South Africans. Government 
responded by introducing a new grant programme, the Land Redistribution for 
Agricultural Development (LRAD) programme in August 2001 with a less ambitious 
objective of transferring 30 per cent of white-owned farmland to previously 
disadvantaged South Africans over 15 years (i.e. two percent per annum). 
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In addition to the government's land redistribution programme, private and semi-private 
initiatives have emerged to redistribute farmland to previously disadvantaged people. The 
BASIS Collaborative Research Support Programme sponsored by the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID) has monitored government (SLAG) and private 
farmland transactions in the province of KwaZulu-Natal since 1997. This study builds on 
these previous analyses of farmland transactions by comparing the performance of LRAD 
relative to private transactions in transferring farmland to previously disadvantaged South 
Africans during 2002, and contrasts the results with those from years 1997 to 2001. 
Results from the study indicate that the launch of LRAD in 200 I had a significant impact 
on land redistribution in 2002. In KwaZulu-Natal, the rate of land redistribution doubled 
from 0.5 per cent in 2001 to one percent in 2002. The results also show that LRAD has 
not only succeeded in drawing private resources into the land reform process, but has also 
been more successful in targeting women than the earlier SLAG programme. Findings 
further show that unlike the earlier (SLAG) programme, LRAD offers larger grants to 
wealthier and more-creditworthy beneficiaries and is therefore conducive to establishing 
farms owned and operated by individuals or by small groups of individuals. A small area 
(1,454 hectares) was transferred back to previously advantaged owners in 2002. Such 
transactions were not detected before 2002 and should be monitored to identify the 
underlining reasons for these sales. It is also recommended that research should be 
conducted to ascertain whether improvements in the rate of land redistribution in 
KwaZulu-Natal during 2002 will be sustained in the future. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The deracialisation of land holding in South Africa is viewed as an urgent imperative for 
political stability and growth of the economy. At the beginning of the 1990's, it was 
estimated that 12 million black people lived on only 17.1 million hectares ofland, whilst 
60,000 white commercial farmers occupied 86.2 million hectares (Baber, 1991: 54). This 
highly skewed distribution of land in South Africa was legally entrenched by the Natives 
Land Act of 1913. This Act designated about eight per cent of the country's agricultural 
land as reserves, which became the only areas that could be legally farmed by Africans. 
With the transition to democracy in 1994, expectations were high that an African 
National Congress (ANC)-led government would address the apartheid legacy of land 
shortages and redress poverty in rural areas by providing agricultural opportunities. Such 
expectations were reinforced by the 1994 Reconstruction and Development Programme 
(RDP) released as part of the ANC's election manifesto that included a commitment to 
redistribute 30 per cent of the country's commercial farmland to previously 
disadvantaged South Africans within five years (ANC, 1994). 
In 1994, an ANC-Ied government initiated a land redistribution programme by offering 
Settlement/Land Acquisition Grants (SLAG) to previously disadvantaged South Africans 
to purchase formerly white-owned farms on a willing buyer-willing seller basis. A means 
test applied to SLAG applicants precluded individuals with a monthly household income 
greater than RI,500. Consequently, the relatively wealthy had to purchase land privately. 
By the end of 2000, the SLAG redistribution programme had transferred about 780,407 
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hectares to previously disadvantaged households, which represented only three per cent 
of the 25 million hectares that the government had initially hoped to redistribute during 
this period (NLC, 2000a), and the opportunities anticipated for beneficiaries were not 
realised as very few income-generating projects were established (LIMA, 1998). The 
government, through the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Affairs (MALA), responded 
by introducing a new redistribution programme in 2001, the Land Redistribution for 
Agricultural Development (LRAD) programme aimed at transferring 30 per cent of 
white-owned farmland to previously disadvantaged South Africans over 15 years 
(MALA, 2001). In addition, at least one-third of the land redistributed by LRAD is 
intended to benefit women. 
Before the inception of LRAD, disadvantaged buyers could finance land purchases in two 
ways, the poorest qualified for cash grants from the government, but the relatively 
wealthy had to purchase land privately. Means testing was abandoned under the LRAD 
programme. Since August 2001, aspiring farmers have been encouraged to purchase land 
by combining a (larger) LRAD grant with equity and mortgage loan finance. Although 
the programme was introduced during August 2001, no LRAD-assisted farmland 
transfers were recorded in KwaZulu-Natal until 2002. 
Empirical evidence about the rate of land redistribution is scarce because very little is 
known about private land purchases. The BASIS Collaborative Research Support 
Programme sponsored by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID} has 
monitored government (SLAG) and private farmland transactions in KwaZulu-Natal 
since 1997 (Graham & Lyne, 1999a; Graham & Lyne, 1999b; Lyne & Darroch, 2003). 
This study builds on these previous analyses of farmland transactions by comparing the 
performance of LRAD relative to private transactions in transferring farmland to 
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previously disadvantaged South Africans during 2002, and contrasts the results with 
those from years 1997-2001. The study also examines whether LRAD has been more 
successful in engaging financial institutions than the earlier SLAG programme as well as 
the characteristics of farmland acquired by previously disadvantaged females compared 
to their male counterparts. The objective is to generate objective information about land 
redistribution in KwaZulu-Natal and the performance of government's LRAD 
programme relative to private transactions and the earlier SLAG programme. The study 
uses discriminant analysis to determine the performance of different modes of land 
redistribution with respect to various farm and gender characteristics associated with land 
redistribution. The study also analyses reverse land transfers detected in 2002, where 
farmland transferred from previously disadvantaged individuals to historically more 
advantaged ones. The objective is to determine the rate of reverse transfers and to 
contrast the farmland characteristics of reverse transfers with those of redistibutive 
farmland transfers. 
The thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 1 gives an overview of government's land 
reform policy, and the extent to which these policies have been implemented with respect 
to land redistribution. The chapter also identifies private and semi-private modes of land 
redistribution that have emerged to deal with apartheid legacies. Chapter 2 presents the 
methodology used to identify land transactions that transferred ownership from 
previously advantaged to previously disadvantaged people in 2002. This is followed by 
an analysis of the 2002 census survey. Chapter 3 presents the results from discriminant 
analysis used to establish the performance of the different market modes of redistribution 
observed in KwaZulu-Natal over the period 1997-2002. Chapter 4 analyses reverse land 
transactions. The study ends with conclusions and policy recommendations drawn from 
the research findings. 
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CHAPTERl 
LAND REFORM POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
The evolution of the ANC government's approach to the land question in South Africa 
since 1994 can be traced through two policy documents. First, the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP) which unequivocally states, "abolition of the Land Acts 
cannot redress inequities in land distribution. Only a tiny minority of black people can 
afford land on the free market. Therefore State intervention in the form of a national land 
reform programme should be the driving force of not only redressing past injustices but 
also to build the rural economy" (ANC, 1994: 19-22). Second, the Constitution of South 
Africa - adopted in 1996 - provides the framework for land policy in the following 
clause of section 25 in the Bill of Rights: 
"The State must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its 
available resources, to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to 
land on an equitable basis. A person or community whose tenure of land is legally 
insecure as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to 
the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either to tenure which is legally 
secure or to comparable redress. A person or community dispossessed of property 
after June 1913 as a result of past racially discriminatory laws is entitled to the 
extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either to restitution of that property or to 
equitable redress" (RSA Constitution, 1996). 
These two policy documents provided the backbone of the 1997 white paper on land 
reform which details the ANC government's land reform programme in the post-1994 
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period. This programme has three components, namely; land restitution, tenure reform 
and land redistribution. 
1.1 Land restitution 
It is estimated that more than 3.5 million black people in rural and urban areas were 
forcibly dispossessed of their land during the years of apartheid (DLA, 2000). Restitution 
was introduced in 1994 with the aim of returning land or compensating people who lost 
their land as a result of racist land laws. This principle is seen as an important component 
of reconciliation in South Africa. 
The Restitution of Land Rights Act, Act 22 of 1994, deals with restitution claims. This 
Act is implemented by the Commission on Restitution of Land Rights and a special court, 
the Land Claims Court with powers equivalent to those of the High Court. A restitution 
claim qualifies for investigation if the claimant was dispossessed of a right to land after 
June 1913 as a result of racially discriminating laws, or if the claimant was not paid just 
compensation when his or her land was expropriated under the Expropriation Act, Act 63 
of 1975. Initially claims had to be lodged before 1 May 1998, but this deadline was later 
extended to 31 December 1998. In the end, a total of67,531 claims were lodged with the 
Land Claims Commission before the December cut off date (NLC, 2000b). The Act 
makes provision for three broad categories of relief for claimants: restoration of the land 
under claim, granting of alternative land, or financial compensation (DLA, 1997a). The 
Commission investigates the merits of each claim, and mediates and settles disputes 
arising from such claims. However, if it is not possible to settle a claim by way of 
mediation and negotiation, the matter is referred to the Land Claims Court. 
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The restitution process turned out to be legalistic, bureaucratic and very slow. By the end 
of 1998, only 28 claims had been settled (Agricultural News, 2000). However, following 
amendments to the Restitution of Land Rights Act in 1997 and 1999 (giving claimants 
direct access to the Land Claims Court without first going to the Commission, and 
delegating the power to resolve uncontroversial claims to regional Commissions) and an 
instruction to the Commission by President Thabo Mbeki to finalise all land claims by the 
end of 2005, the rate at which claims are processed has improved remarkably. Recent 
data (DLA, 2004) show that, 48,463 claims, or 71 per cent of all claims. lodged by the 
extended deadline, have been settled, and a total of 571,103 hectares of land has been 
restored. Despite the increase in delivery, budget allocations to land reform, may render it 
impossible to settle all restitution claims by the end of 2005. Although the restitution 
budget has been increased from R375 million in 2002/3 to R800 million in 2003/4 and 
R993 million in 2004/5, which is a sign of the political will and commitment to settle all 
outstanding claims by 2005, land reform experts estimate that it will cost at least RIO 
billion to settle the remaining claims (Mail & Guardian, 2004). The Chief Land Claims 
Commissioner acknowledges that the budget allocations are inadequate adding that the 
Commission needs about Rl.2 billion for claims that are prioritized for settlement during 
2004 alone (DLA, 2003a). 
Most settled claims are in urban areas and many involve the payment of financial 
compensation rather than the return of land (Lahiff, 2001). Very few rural claims 
particularly in provinces with the best quality agricultural land have been settled. By 
March 2003 only 635 claims had been settled in Mpumalanga and 777 in Northern 
Province, compared to 11,045 and 7,373 claims settled in the Eastern Cape and Gauteng 
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respectively (DLA, 2003b). It is likely that most of the latter claims stemmed from forced 
removals in Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth and East London. 
The National Land Committee (NLC) has criticised the prioritisation of urban claims 
over rural claims as a pUblicity tool because urban claims tend to be high profile cases, 
earning government better publicity (NLC, 2000b). However, recent policy statements by 
the Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs suggest that the DLA is shifting its focus 
towards settling rural claims (DLA, 2003c). Unfortunately, rural land claims are dogged 
by a number of challenges, including the problem of getting relevant documentation to 
verify claims, the fact that rural claims are almost always disputed by current landowners, 
and claimants' strong preferences to return to the land. Commercial farmers in 
Mpumalanga and N0l1hern Province established a fund in 2000 to defend their property 
rights against claims (Financial Mail, 2000a), increasing the prospect of lengthy delays in 
resolving these claims. 
1.2 Tenure reform 
Land tenure is defined by the terms and conditions on which land is held, used and 
transacted (DeWet, 1987). In South Africa, tenure reform has two main components. One 
is the reform of tenure arrangements in communal areas, mainly of the former 
homelands, and the other relates to the security of tenure of farm workers and labour 
tenants residing on white-owned commercial farms. Tenure reform in the former 
homelands is outside the scope of this study as it does not involve the redistribution of 
farmland from whites to previously disadvantaged owners. 
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Labour tenants, like most faIm workers, reside on the faIms where they work but do not 
receive a wage. Instead they are paid in teImS of rights to grazing, arable and residential 
land. Farm workers across the country have expressed a need for residential land that is 
not tied to employment (Marcus et aI, 1996). Amongst labour tenants there is a strong 
demand for arable and grazing land. In addition, both groups want improved security of 
tenure (Marcus et ai, 1996). The NLC (2000a) argues that many black families have been 
living on white-owned commercial faIms for generations, yet they continue to face 
arbitrary evictions. 
Since 1994 two Acts have been legislated to address this issue. The Extension of Security 
of Tenure Act (commonly known as ESTA), Act 62 of 1997, protects farm workers 
against unlawful eviction. Landowners wishing to evict workers or their families can do 
so only in accordance with law and by court order. Occupiers of rural land who have 
worked on a faIm for longer than ten years and have either reached the age of 60 years or 
are unable to provide labour due to ill health, injury or disability may not be evicted. 
Section 4 of EST A allows faIm dwellers to apply for government grants to purchase land 
(DLA, 1997b). 
Labour tenancy remains widespread in KwaZulu-Natal and Mpumalanga despite active 
state intervention to outlaw it between 1960 and 1980 (Lahiff, 2001). It is estimated that 
there are at least 1.2 million labour tenants in KwaZulu-Natal, and over 20,000 in 
Mpumalanga (Marcus et ai, 1996). Chapter 2 of the Labour Tenants Act, Act 3 of 1996, 
provides for protective tenure. Tenants cannot be evicted simply because the owner 
decides to give them notice unless they have breached the contract or are guilty of 
misconduct. Chapter 3 of the Act deals with the right of labour tenants to acquire land 
9 
that they occupy or use (DLA, 1997b). The Act is having the desired effects in provinces 
where labour tenants are concentrated, although at first it was resisted by white farmers. 
By June 2002, 2,654 out of 6,000 valid labour tenants claims had been settled in 
KwaZulu-Natal (DLA, 2002). 
1.3 Land redistribution 
In line with the neo-liberal macroeconomic policies of government (eg. its Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution strategy), the land reform programme is also based on 
respect for private property and minimal state intervention in markets, including land 
markets. Rather than assuming an active role in the redistribution process, the 
government decided not to buy land itself but to offer cash grants to eligible beneficiaries 
(the urban landless and rural poor, labour tenants, farm workers and emerging farmers) to 
purchase land. In other words, the redistribution programme is market-based involving 
willing buyers and sellers. 
Between 1995 and 1999, households with a joint monthly income of less than Rl,500 
could apply for a SettlementlLand Acquisition Grant (SLAG) ofR15,000 (later increased 
to RI6,000) to buy land. Most projects involved groups of applicants pooling their grants 
to buy formerly white-owned farms. This was largely due to the Sub-division of 
Agricultural Land Act, Act 70 of 1970, that not only constrains the subdivision of farms 
into smaller parcels of land but also prohibits co-ownership in undivided shares of 
farmland by individuals other than husband and wife. Groups of buyers had to establish a 
legal entity, usually a Community Land Trust (CLT) or Communal Property Association 
(CP A), to take ownership of the land. These legal entities have also been established by 
groups receiving land under restitution and tenure reform programmes (labour tenants 
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and farm workers). The delay in repealing the Sub-division Act is attributed to the 
absence of zoning legislation regulating the conversion of farmland into residential or 
commercial use (Graham, 2000:19). In the meantime subdivision of farmland requires 
approval by the Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs. 
The size of SLAG beneficiary groups typically ranged from 40-120 households (LIMA, 
1998) depending on the cost of the farm. Case studies of these land reform projects raised 
concerns about the consequences of group settlement arrangements. LIMA (1998:55-60) 
reported that large beneficiary user groups find it difficult to establish management 
structures and to define and enforce rules of land use. These group settlement structures 
also entrenched the free-rider problem, and consequently did not establish conditions for 
effective land use or creditworthiness. In some cases mismanagement of the property 
forced the beneficiaries to sell their land (Turner & Ibsen, 2000: 10). To avoid these 
problems, some groups of farm workers followed a non-user approach, using their grants 
to purchase equity in existing commercial farming enterprises. These equity-sharing 
schemes have also been able to attract loan finance to complement equity invested by 
worker-beneficiaries and the previous (white) owner (Knight & Lyne, 2003). 
The redistribution programme soon fell short of the RDP target of redistributing 30 per 
cent of commercial farmland within five years. Less than two per cent of white-owned 
farmland was transferred to previously disadvantaged South Africans between 1995 and 
1999 (NLC, 2000a). The land reform programme also aimed" at achieving a better 
quality of life for the most disadvantaged by giving households the opportunity to engage 
in productive land use in a manner which promotes both equity and efficiency" (DLA, 
1997a: 7). However, the grant programme had little impact on reducing poverty and 
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gender inequality. In September 1999 it was estimated that only 15 per cent of 50,152 
beneficiary households were female headed (NLC, 2000c) and few income generating 
projects were established (LIMA, 1998: 63). The SLAG programme did not require its 
beneficiaries to make a financial contribution towards the purchase of land. As a result, 
households applied for SLAG even if they were not committed to farming . Most 
beneficiaries took up residential sites and went on with their multiple rural livelihood 
survival strategies (Turner & Ibsen, 2000). 
According to government, one of the reasons for the disappointing results was over-
reliance on willing sellers. Agriculture and Land Affairs Minister, the honourable Thoko 
Didiza, claimed that while government demonstrated a willingness to negotiate land 
prices it did not receive the same level of commitment from the majority of landowners 
they negotiated with (Agricultural News, 2000). On the other hand, the commercial 
farmers ' agricultural union, AgriSA, argued that its members offered land to prospective 
beneficiaries but deals collapsed because it took between one and four years for the 
transaction to be completed (Financial Mail, 2000b). 
Other reasons cited as causes of the poor performance of the SLAG programme are: 
• Excessive centralization of administration that required ministerial approval for 
every project and a cumbersome grant approval procedure (Kirsten & Van Zyl, 
1999). 
• Poor coordination between the DLA and provincial and national Departments of 
Agriculture leading to a lack of appropriate assistance to help beneficiaries build 
their lives and production on the land once it was theirs (Lahiff, 2001). Without 
this assistance the long term success of most of the land redistribution projects 
was severely handicapped. 
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• Unsuitability of the programme for emerging farmers. The means test applied to 
determine eligibility precluded individuals with a monthly household income 
greater than Rl,SOO (Lyne & Darroch, 2003). 
Upon taking over the land portfolio in June 1999, Minister Didiza commissioned a 
sweeping review of the redistribution programme, calling for it to be broadened to cater 
for those aspiring to become full-time farmers and for closer links between DLA and 
national/provincial Departments , of Agriculture. As part of the review, the Minister 
imposed a moratorium on further Settlement/Land Acquisition Grants early in 2000, 
which was later lifted in 2002. 
A new grant programme, entitled the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development 
(LRAD) programme was launched in August 2001 with a less ambitious objective of 
redistributing 30 per cent of the country's agricultural land over 15 years (National 
Department Agriculture, 2001). The programme is implemented jointly by the DLA and 
National Department of Agriculture (NDA). The DLA provides funds for land acquisition 
while the NDA provides training and extension support to beneficiaries. The NDA is yet 
to start providing training to beneficiaries, which could hamper efficient use of newly 
acquired farms. 
LRAD transactions are exempt from the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act, Act 70 of 
1970 (MALA, 2001: 10). However Lyne and Darroch (2003) argue that despite the 
exemption of grant transactions, the costs associated with subdivision (eg. land survey) 
are still prohibitively high and discourage existing owners from selling (affordable) 
portions of their land to emerging farmers. Moreover, the exemption applies only to 
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government-assisted transfers and, therefore does nothing to improve market access for 
private buyers. 
LRAD differs from the SLAG programme in that there is no means test. Beneficiaries do 
not have to be poor to qualify for a minimum grant of R20,OOO and those who have more 
savings and who can raise bigger loans to finance their farms qualify for larger grants, the 
maximum grant being RlOO,OOO. The actual size of the grant an applicant gets depends 
on the amount of equity and debt capital the applicant is able to contribute to the 
enterprise. An own contribution of R400,000 leverages the maximum grant of RlOO,OOO. 
This marks a distinct shift in the redistribution policy away from poverty alleviation and 
group settlement in favour of settling prospective farmers on their own farms. LRAD 
grants can also be used by farm workers to purchase equity in the farming enterprises 
where they are employed. 
The shift away from poverty alleviation is not without its critics. According to Lahiff 
(2001), the minimum own contribution (R5,000) required of each beneficiary to qualify 
for the minimum grant of R20,000 will tend to favour applicants who already have a 
reasonably strong asset base, and exclude the poor and landless. In a similar vein, Nku.zi 
(2000) an affiliate ofNLC, argues that the average wage for farm workers in the Northern 
Province is about R300 per month, or R3,600 per year. Such people are unlikely to 
accumulate R5,000 in cash to qualify for the minimum grant. In practice, the required 
own contribution has not disqualified poor applicants because labour supplied by the 
applicant is treated as a contribution in kind (sweat equity). 
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Lahiff (2001) further argues that no mechanisms have been put in place to ensure that 
women fully participate in the programme despite the fact that they outnumber men 
. almost universally in rural areas. The LRAD policy has tried to promote access to land 
for women-headed households by emphasising that "women can apply for grants to 
acquire land individually, or can pool their grants with whom they choose, therefore 
augmenting their control of the manner in which they benefit from the LRAD 
programme. Also, women-only projects are allowed and encouraged, and altogether not 
less than one third of the transferred land resources must accrue to women" (National 
Department of Agriculture, 2001:8). Nevertheless, gender activists argue that the 
programme remains unspecific as to how gender bias and deep rooted socio-economic 
obstacles to female participation will be overcome. According to Turner and Ibsen 
(2000:32), the programme provides little evidence to make its target of transferring at 
least one-third of redistributed land to women seem credible. Given that over 70 per cent 
of the country's poorest people live in rural areas, and most of these households are 
headed by women (Kepe & Cousins, 2002), it is imperative that land reform programmes 
specifically target this group through affirmative action measures. For example, a 
predetermined share of the money allocated to LRAD should be dedicated to women. 
Patterns of customary rights and laws pervasive in rural areas usually mean that women 
are elbowed out by men if they are not specifically targeted (DLA, 1997a). 
1.4 Other land redistribution initiatives 
In addition to the government's land redistribution programme, private and semi-private 
initiatives have emerged to redistribute farmland to previously disadvantaged people. 
These initiatives include private land purchases and equity-sharing schemes. 
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1.4.1 Private land purchases 
Few disadvantaged South Africans can afford to buy commercial farms without mortgage 
loans. However, conventional mortgage loans amortized with constant payments of 
principal plus interest create severe cash flow (liquidity) problems for borrowers during 
the early years of their enterprise when inflation rates are high (Nieuwoudt & Vink, 
1995). 
According to Nieuwoudt & Vink (1995) the cash flow problem arises because inflation 
increases nominal interest rates on conventional mortgage loans while deferring returns 
(future returns on land are increased by inflation). This creates temporary but severe cash 
flow problems for borrowers who are unable to make a substantial down-payment on the 
purchase price of the farm. The liquidity problem diminishes over time as inflation raises 
future earnings relative to the fixed loan repayments. In other words, the farmers' debt 
repayment capacity improves over time in line with inflation. 
This temporary cash flow problem could be removed by providing an interest rate 
subsidy that diminishes at the expected rate of inflation over a finite period of time 
(Nieuwoudt & Vink, 1995). The subsidy allows for a below-market interest rate to be 
charged in the early years of the loan making it possible for the new farmer to meet his or 
her instalment payments from the limited cash flow earned by the enterprise during its 
early critical years. 
Nieuwoudt and Vink (1995) recommend a finite interest rate subsidy that is phased out 
with the expected increase in inflation (ie the nominal interest rate the farmer pays 
gradually increases each year at the expected rate of inflation until it equals the prevailing 
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market rate). In their case study, Nieuwoudt and Vink (1995) show that the interest rate 
subsidy will phase out after 11 years if the annual rate of inflation is 12 per cent and the 
buyer pays an affordable five per cent interest rate on the full purchase price in the first 
year. After 11 years the buyer pays the full annual interest rate on the loan for the 
remaining period. 
A variant of this graduated repayment concept has been used in KwaZulu-Natal by 
private sugar millers to sell farmland to emerging commercial farmers since 1995. In 
1996, Illovo Sugar Company invited applications for 20 medium scale sugar-cane farms 
from previously disadvantaged individuals. However, none of the more than 100 
applicants could afford a down-payment that would reduce the mortgage loan to a level 
that could be serviced from sugar-cane farming (Graham & Lyne, 1999c). To mitigate 
this problem, the miller agreed to sell the land at market-related prices to the applicants 
and to pass on 18 per cent of the purchase price to the financier, Ithala Finance and 
Development Corporation. lthala invests these funds and uses the capital and interest to 
finance a finite diminishing interest rate subsidy on the mortgage loan (Simms, 1996). 
In effect, Illovo Sugar Company discounted the price of its land by 18 per cent and Itha1a 
used this private subsidy to red\lce the mortgage loan rate from the long-term annual rate 
of 16.5 per cent to ten percent in the first year. The subsidy then declines to zero at the 
end of year six in line with expected increases in nominal income associated with an 
annual inflation rate of roughly ten per cent (Simms, 1996). The buyer then pays the full 
annual interest rate of 16.5 per cent for the remaining 14 years of the 20-year loan period. 
Since its inception this scheme has helped approximately 142 emerging farmers to 
acquire medium-sized sugar-cane farms in KwaZulu-Natal (Sunday Tribune, 2003). 
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A partial solution for solving the cash flow problem would be to defer all or part of the 
farmer's debt repayments during the critical early years. However, commercial lenders 
are usually unwilling to defer debt repayments, even if interest charges are fully 
capitalised and the credit-worthiness of the enterprise improves, as deferment transfers 
the cash flow problem from the borrower to the lending institution (DLA, 1999). To 
address this issue, the Department of Land Affairs established the Land Reform 
Empowerment Facility (LREF) in 1999. The LREF wholesales unsubsidised loans with a 
deferred repayment schedule to commercial banks that lend, on similar terms, to clients 
financing land purchases or equity-sharing projects (DLA, 1999). The client submits a 
business plan to a commercial bank to evaluate. If the enterprise is profitable but cannot 
be financed with the conventional term loan due to a temporary cash flow problem, the 
bank designs a loan with a deferred repayment schedule and applies to the LREF for a 
matching loan with the same repayment schedule but with interest charged at the 
wholesale rate. In this way, the bank transfers the liquidity problem from its client to the 
LREF. 
Besides broadening private sector lenders' participation in the land redistribution effort, 
the LREF bears virtually no risk as it lends only to registered banks, and incurs low 
administration costs as the loans are assessed for financial viability by the risk bearing 
banks. The LREF'S own valuation is limited to an assessment of redistribution criteria. 
Response to the LERF has been positive, with loan disbursements reaching the target of 
Rl5 million set for the first year within just eight months of its launch. According to 
Lyne et al (2000) this positive response by banks can be attributed to two factors. First, 
the ability of the LREF to improve the risk profile of its target beneficiaries by inheriting 
18 
their initial cash flow problem. Second, the discounts on wholesale interest rates charged 
by the LREF implicitly subsidise the cost of capital to banks. 
1.4.2 Farm worker equity-sharing schemes 
Knight and Lyne (2002) define farm worker equity-sharing schemes (FWES) as farming 
operations in which the original owner, farm workers and other investors own financial 
equity in the form of tradable shares that define their voting and benefit rights (profits 
and capital gains). The first equity-sharing scheme in South Africa was the Whitehall 
apple farm in 1994 (Eckert et al., 1996). Today there are over 50 farm worker equity-
sharing projects in South Africa (Knight & Lyne, 2002), mostly in the Western Cape 
Province. Equity-sharing saves on a range of transaction costs such as subdivision costs, 
and transfer fees (Van Rooyen & Njobe, 1996), and has the advantage of redistributing 
wealth and income in excess of that attributed to just land. FWES also provide farm 
workers with an opportunity to enter capital intensive farming industries (eg. fruit, wine, 
forestry), which otherwise would be impossible due to indivisible resources and the high 
cost of entry. According to Hamman and Ewert (1999), the cost of entry into the wine 
sector is more than four times the value of a Settlement/Land Acquisition Grant, 
excluding land purchase. This, combined with the long lead-in period of four years before 
the first harvest can be picked (in the deciduous fruit sector it may take up to ten years 
before a profit is realised), effectively prevents aspiring farmers from entering such 
capital intensive industries as owner-operators. 
In 1998, the Surplus People's Project (SPP) identified a number of concerns regarding 
equity-sharing schemes related to worker participation during establishment, 
beneficiaries' expectations, power relations between worker-shareholders and the original 
owner, transfer of skills, labour relations, position of employees who are not 
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shareholders, gender issues, tenure security and issues concerning entry to and exit from 
a project (Knight & Lyne, 2002). A later study of eight equity-share schemes conducted 
by Knight (2003) in the Western Cape showed that many of the concerns raised by the 
SPP had been corrected in the more successful projects. Worker-shareholders in these 
eight schemes had purchased net farm assets worth R 7 million (measured in constant 
2001 prices) representing 3.5-50 per cent of total shareholding. Whereas Hall et al. 
(2001) argue that FWES might be failing to meet the objectives of redistributing 
ownership, Knight and Lyne (2002) showed that this was not viewed as a serious 
problem by beneficiaries interviewed in their study. Likewise, while Hall et al. (200 1) 
argue that FWES fail to improve gender equality, Knight and Lyne (2002) show that 
women made up over 50 per cent of shareholders at 63 per cent of the eight projects that 
they studied. 
Initially, farm workers financed their equity in the company with mortgage loans leading 
to the usual cash flow problems. However, this changed in 1996 when the DLA allowed 
farm workers to finance equity with SLAG grants, and in May 1999 when it launched the 
Land Reform Empowerment Facility. The LREF approved R27.2 million to finance 
equity-sharing projects in its first year of operation (Lyne & Darroch, 2003). The new 
LRAD programme also supports FWESs. A good example is the recent transfer of Heidel 
egg farm by a commercial farmer to the Nkosana Trust in Mpumalanga Province during 
October 2003. The trust has seven trustees and 200 beneficiaries who are all part of the 
labour force. The DLA provided LRAD grants worth RI0.8 million and the Land Bank 
provided a loan of R9.6 million. In addition, the Standard Bank of South Africa approved 
a RI million overdraft for working capital. The previous owner was contracted to ensure 
that skills transfer takes place. 
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CHAPTER 2 
AN ANALYSIS OF FARMLAND TRANSACTIONS OF 1997-2002 
2.1 Data sources 
Data for this study were drawn from annual census surveys of the deeds of transfer 
recorded for farmland in KwaZulu-Natal from 1997-2002. Lyne and Darroch (2003) 
previously analysed data from 1997-2001 census surveys. The South African Deeds 
Registry maintains a database of all land transactions involving transfer .()} title. A 
transfer deed records information about the buyer, the seller, the area transacted, the 
region where the farm is located, the market price paid (unless the transfer was the result 
of bequest, donation or legal claim) and, where relevant, the size of mortgage loan(s) and 
name of the lender(s). 
Land transactions recorded by the Deeds Registry in 2002 were filtered and stratified by 
race, gender and mode of land acquisition (see Figure 1)1. Under the filtration process, 
all transactions listed separately by the Deeds Registry for each subdivision of land, but 
acquired by the same owner, were consolidated. Then all transactions involving areas 
smaller than one hectare and those with per hectare prices exceeding that commanded by 
the best quality agricultural land in KwaZulu-Natal (R 30,000) were removed in an 
attempt to exclude transfers of rural land to residential and industrial uses. 
Transactions involving land transfers from one formerly disadvantaged owner to another 
were removed unless the land transferred from males to females. The remaining farmland 
transfers were then classified as 'advantaged to advantaged', 'advantaged to 
I The stratification of 2002 land transactions differed from the stratification applied to the 1997-2001 
census surveys (see Graham & Lyne, 1999a) in order to investigate transfers financed with a combination 
of LRAD grant and private mortgage loans. 
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disadvantaged' and 'disadvantaged to advantaged' based on the race and gender of the 
previous and new owners. The 'advantaged to disadvantaged' transactions were then 
categorized into five strata according to mode of land acquisition, namely grant only2, 
mortgage loan plus LRAD grant financed, mortgage financed, cash purchases and 
non-market transfers. 
The term 'advantaged' refers to legal and juristic persons that had the right to transact in 
land prior to 1994 (i.e. whites, government departments and white-owned corporate 
entities). The 'disadvantaged' group comprises of those persons excluded from land 
markets on the basis of racial segregation (i.e. blacks, Indians and coloureds). In addition, 
transfers from previously disadvantaged men to previously disadvantaged women were 
retained within the previously disadvantaged category so that the definition of 
'disadvantaged' refers to all individuals who were previously excluded from land markets 
on the basis of racial and, to some extent, gender segregation. 
It is important to note that the transfer deeds do not explicitly show the race and gender 
of either the seller or the buyer. Without this information the race and gender of the 
buyers and sellers was established on the basis of their names. Where land had been 
acquired by corporate entities such as close corporations, records from the Registrar of 
Companies were used to determine whether or not the land had transferred to 
disadvantaged beneficiaries. While every effort was made to correctly identify 
advantaged and disadvantaged groups, the author accepts that some transactions may 
have been misclassified. As a result, the true annual rate of land redistribution in 
KwaZulu-Natal may be understated. 
2 Grant only refers to land transfers partially or entirely financed with government SLAG or LRAD grants 
but without additional loan finance. 
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Of the 3,156 rural land transactions recorded in 2002, the filtration process yielded 1010 
'farmland transfers'. These were then separated into three groups based on the race of the 
seller and new owner, 'advantaged to advantaged' (787), 'disadvantaged to advantaged 
(51), and 'advantaged to disadvantaged' (172). The 172 'advantaged to disadvantaged' 
transactions were then categorized into five strata according to mode of redistribution, 
namely grant only (46), mortgage financed (10), mortgage loan plus LRAD grant 
financed (14), cash purchases (76) and non-market transfers (26) (Appendix 1). 
2.2 The rate of land redistribution 
The total area of all farmland transfelTed to new owners in KwaZulu-Natal annually 
during 1997-2002 is presented in Table 1. At the time of South Africa's political 
democratisation in 1994, there were some 5.3 million hectares of land available for 
redistribution in KwaZulu-Natal (Lyne & Darroch, 2003), comprised of commercial 
farmland and state owned land, including public protected nature conservation areas. It is 
estimated that 2,167,822 hectares, or 40 per cent, of this land transferred to new owners 
(advantaged and disadvantaged groups) dm1ng 1997-2002. The total area of farmland 
transacted in KwaZulu-Natal during 2002 is similar to the mean annual area transacted 
during the preceding five years. 
The annual rate of farmland redistribution was computed by expressing the area acquired 
by previously disadvantaged entrants as a percentage of the area originally available for 
redistribution in KwaZulu-Natal. Trends in the rate ofland redistribution are illustrated in 
Figure 2. Transfers to previously disadvantaged South Africans accounted for 177,895 
hectares representing about 8.2 per cent of total farmland transferred, or 3.4 per cent of 
the total area originally available for redistribution. The rate of farmland redistribution 
declined to its lowest level of 0.33 per cent in 2000 following a moratorium on the SLAG 
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programme early that year. The rate of redistribution improved to 0.52 per cent in 2001 
after the moratorium was lifted and, following the launch of LRAD, doubled to 1.06 per 
cent in 2002. 
Table 1: Estimated annual rates ofland redistribution in KwaZulu-Natal, 1997-2002 
Study year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
1 Area of farmland originally 
available for redistribution 
(Ha) 5,308,559 5,308,559 5,308,559 5,308,559 5,308,559 5,308,559 
~ Area ofland transacte((Ha) 372,995 603,522 306,433 300,799 267,233 316,840 
3 Area of farmland acquired 
Iby, or for, disadvantaged 
people (Ha) 22,934 17,772 36,109 17,345 27,324 56,411 
4 Rate of land redistribution 
(%) ([3/1] * 100) 0.43 0.34 0.68 0.33 0.52 1.06 
Cumulative rate of land 
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Figure 2: Estimated annual and cumulative rates of farmland redistribution to 
previously disadvantaged owners in KwaZulu-Natal, 1997-2002 
Despite this recent improvement, the rate of land redistribution is still well short of the 
government's target. Possible reasons for this are discussed in section 2.4. To reach a 
level of 30 per cent over 15 years would require an average transfer of about 106,000 
hectares per annum in KwaZulu-Natal, about twice the amount transferred during 2002. 
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2.3 Characteristics of farmland acquired by advantaged and disadvantaged owners 
Table 2 compares the mean area of all farms, and the mean price of all purchased farms, 
acquired by previously advantaged and disadvantaged people in KwaZulu-Natal over the 
period 1997-2002. The table also compares the weighted price of land purchased by 
members of these groups. All prices are expressed in real terms using 2000 as the base 
year. The t-values test for differences in the mean characteristics of farms acquired by the 
advantaged and disadvantaged groups. 
Table 2: Characteristics of farmland acquired by previously advantaged and 
disadvantaged owners in KwaZulu-Natal, 1997-2002 (at constant 2000 
prices) 
n farm area (Ha) 
all farms transacted 
n real price (R) 
all farms purchased 
real land price 
for all farms 
rchased 
Note: *** and •• denote statistical significance at the 1 and 5 percent level of probability, 
respectively. 
During 2002, and for the first time during the 1997-2002 study period, the mean area of 
farms acquired by the disadvantaged group was not significantly lower than for the 
advantaged group. Despite this increase in relative farm size, the mean price paid for 
farms by the previously disadvantaged group remained significantly lower than for the 
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advantaged group. To the extent that the weighted price of land per hectare reflects land 
quality, the average quality of farmland bought by disadvantaged entrants during 2002 
was not only lower than that purchased by the advantaged group, but has also declined 
relative to the mean quality of farmland purchased by this group between 1997-2001. 
The moratorium on SLAG during 2000 and 2001 appears to have restricted purchases by 
groups of disadvantaged people, raising the weighted price paid for land during these two 
years. After the moratorium was lifted, a backlog of SLAG-assisted purchases was 
processed during 2002, lowering the weighted price of land purchased by disadvantaged 
buyers that year. Higher weighted prices paid for land by the disadvantaged group during 
earlier years of the study may be the result of interest rate subsidies offered by private 
sugar millers to emerging farmers in 1997 and 1998 to buy high quality sugar-cane farms 
(Mashatola and Darroch, 2003). Relationships between mode of purchase and 
characteristics of land acquired by disadvantaged groups are discussed in section 2.4. 
2.4 Modes of land redistribution 
Modes of land redistribution identified in the 1997-2001 census surveys were 
government SLAG-assisted land purchases, private purchases (mortgage loan and private 
cash), and non-market transfers (bequests, and donations). In addition to these modes, 
the 2002 census survey identified land transfers financed using a government LRAD 
grant combined with own equity and a mortgage loan. Table 3 compares characteristics 
of farmland acquired by disadvantaged owners for each mode of land redistribution 
during 1997-2002. Figures 3, 4, 5 and 6 illustrate how these characteristics have varied 
within the study period. All financial values in Table 3 and Figures 5 and 6 are expressed 
in constant 2000 prices. 
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Table 3: Characteristics of farmland acquired by disadvantaged owners by mode of 
redistribution in KwaZulu-Natal, 1997-2002 (constant 2000 prices) 





Although farmland purchased only with government grants transferred over 41 per cent 
of all the land redistributed, these transfers involved land of poor agricultural quality 
relative to private market transactions. This can be attributed to the high proportion of 
group purchases under the SLAG programme where the beneficiaries were primarily 
interested in maximizing land area for residential and grazing purposes. Since August 
2001, aspiring farmers have been encouraged to purchase land by combining an LRAD 
grant with equity and mortgage loan finance. This mode of redistribution accounted for 
six per cent of the total area acquired by previously disadvantaged owners in 2002. 
Fourteen farms were acquired using combined grant and loan finance, transferring 3,404 
hectares with a market value of about R14.22 million to the previously disadvantaged. At 
a weighted price of R4,176 per hectare, the quality of farmland redistributed via this 
mode was significantly higher than that of other government-assisted transfers and cash 
purchases, and is similar in quality to land purchased privately with mortgage loans. 
These public-private partnerships in financing land have been further enhanced by the 
recent recapitalisation of the Land Reform Empowerment Facility (LREF). The LREF 
improves the risk profile of its target beneficiaries by wholesaling loans with a deferred 
repayment schedule to commercial banks that lend, on similar terms, to clients financing 
land purchases or equity-sharing projects. 
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Ithala Development Finance Corporation (Ithala) fmanced 11 of these 14 transactions and 
three were financed by the Land Bank. None were financed by private commercial 
banks. One of the biggest frustrations voiced by Ithala is that grant funds are not readily 
accessible, resulting in delays which often cause potential deals to collapse as sellers find 
other buyers who are not reliant on grants. Apart from wasting Ithala's resources 
(assessing business plans and preparing grant applications for prospective clients) it 
seems that the lack of funds is more apparent than real. This anomaly has arisen because 
the Land Bank, which enjoys the privilege of being the only bank permitted to approve 
LRAD applications, has not processed many of the deals for which it has approved 
grants. In financial year 2001102, the Land Bank received R50 million from the 
Department of Land Affairs (DLA) to award LRAD grants contingent upon loan funding. 
In the same period, the Land Bank approved 152 LRAD applications. Of these approvals, 
only 14 applicants had received their loans and grants by March 2002 (DLA, 2002). 
Consequently, grant funding allocated to the remaining 138 approvals was unavailable to 
other banks and remained unspent at the end of the financial year - a situation that will 
persist if these approved deals eventually collapse. Historical under-spending by the DLA 
is an ongoing problem. According to Lahiff (200 I), the national real level of funding 
allocated to land reform grants by the Treasury declined by 23 per cent between 1998 and 
2001 owing to persistent under-spending of provincial budgets. 
The number of land redistribution transactions has remained consistently between 150 
and 200 transactions per year throughout the study period, except for 1999 when over 
300 redistributive transactions were recorded. Figure 3, however, shows distinct trends 
in the relative proportions of land transferred by each mode of land redistribution 
between 1997 - 2002. The number and relative proportion of private non-market and 
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mortgage loan transactions, which respectively account for almost 40 and 18 per cent of 
total transactions, decreased since 1999 and respectively accounted for only 15 and nine 
per cent of transactions during 2002. The decline in the number of transactions financed 
with mortgage loans since 1999 coincides with the decline in the number of subsidised 
mortgage loans made to medium-scale sugar-cane growers. By contrast, the moratorium 
on the SLAG programme reduced the number of government-assisted transfers during 
2000 and 2001. The relative proportion of government-assisted transfers increased 
during 2002, including 14 transactions financed with a combination of LRAD grants, 
private equity and mortgage finance. The number of private cash transactions per year 
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Figure 3: Annual farmland transactions by mode of redistribution to disadvantaged 
owners in KwaZulu-Natal, 1997-2002 
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Although non-market transactions are the most numerous, the total area of farmland 
transferred via these transactions is small relative to market and government-assisted 
purchases. Over the period 1997-2002 the total area of farmland redistributed by private 
purchases (83,129 hectares made up of 44,542 hectares via cash purchase and 38,587 
hectares via mortgage loans) exceeded that redistributed via government grants (73,745 
hectares). Figure 4 shows that the area purchased only with government grants increased 
steadily after the moratorium on SLAG grants was lifted, peaking in 2002. During 2002 
government-assisted transfers redistributed more land than private market purchases 
(32,028 hectares versus 22,863 hectares). It appears that LRAD is largely responsible for 
the improved rate of land redistribution observed in KwaZulu-Natal during 2002. 
Possible reasons for this improvement include decentralization of the powers for 
implementation and project approval. Provincial governments have now replaced the 
DLA as the key approval and implementing agencies (MALA, 2001:8). This has 
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Figure 4: Annual area of land by mode of redistribution to previously disadvantaged 
owners in KwaZulu-Natal, 1997-2002 
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The number of transactions financed with mortgage loans peaked in 1999, but dipped 
sharply in 2001 when Ithala did not offer subsidised mortgage to medium-scale sugar-
cane growers. Historically, the purchase of medium-scale cane farms accounted for a 
relatively large proportion of land transfers financed with private mortgage loans. The 
interest rate subsidies provided by sugar millers and administered by Ithala prior to 2002 
were designed to help new landowners avoid debt-induced cash flow problems in times 
of high inflation (Mashatola and Darroch, 2003). 
On average, beneficiaries of government grants purchased the largest farms (mean of 
546 hectares), while bequests and donations transferred the smallest farms (mean of 38 
hectares) to previously disadvantaged South Africans. Within the set of private 
purchases, the census results during 1997-2002 show that the mean size of farms financed 
with own cash was small relative to those financed with mortgage loans (119 versus 189 
hectares). These observations are consistent with Nieuwoudt and Vink's (1995) argument 
that buyers with limited equity cannot finance large farms using conventional mortgage 
loans due to cash flow problems. Instead they pay cash for relatively cheaper farms. The 
2002 census survey shows that the size of farms financed with mortgage loans and those 
financed with a combination of LRAD and mortgage loans were, on average, smaller 
than those financed with own cash (152 and 243 hectares respectively versus 280 
hectares). However, the farms purchased with cash were of much lower quality than 
those financed with mortgage loans (RI153/ha vs. R4198/ha). 
Figure 5 shows the contrast in land wealth transferred by the different modes of 
redistribution in KwaZulu-Natal during 1997-2002. From 1997 to 2001, private mortgage 
loans redistributed more land wealth than other market transactions. In 2002, mortgage 
loans (including LRAD-leveraged mortgage loans) continued to redistribute the greatest 
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wealth compared to other market transactions. However, the proportion of land wealth 
redistributed by government grant-financed transactions increased from an average of 17 
per cent during 1997-2001 to 24 per cent in 2002, excluding transactions financed using 
LRAD 1everaged mortgage loans. This reflects the large increase in the number and area 
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Figure 5: Market value of farmland by mode of land redistribution to disadvantaged 
owners in KwaZu1u-Nata1, 1997-2002 
Despite considerable recent growth in the wealth transferred through government-assisted 
land purchases, land financed only with government grants is still of relatively poor 
agricultural quality. Figure 6 shows that in all years of the study the weighted price of 
farmland purchased with government grants was substantially lower than for other modes 
of transfer, and decreased in 2002 after the moratorium on SLAG grants was lifted. In 
future, as group purchases financed with SLAG are superseded by individual purchases 
co-financed with LRAD grants and private mortgage loans, it is expected that 
beneficiaries of government grants will acquire farms of relatively better agricultural 
quality. In 2002, the weighted price of land co-financed with LRAD grants and mortgage 
loans was virtually the same as that financed with own equity and mortgage loans. As 
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was intended, LRAD grants were used by some farmers to supplement their own equity 
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Figure 6: Weighted farmland price (R/ha) by mode of land redistribution to previously 
disadvantaged owners in KwaZulu-Natal, 1997-2002 
2.5 Land redistribution by gender type 
Table 4 compares land transactions according to gender and mode of land purchase. It 
shows that women (as sole owners or married co-owners) are well represented in the 
overall number of transactions involving previously disadvantaged South Africans, 
particularly those involving bequests. Women accounted for 478 out of 1,159 
transactions involving disadvantaged owners (41 per cent) compared to 412 (36 per cent) 
for men only and 269 (23 per cent) for corporate3 owners. Of the market transactions, 
women were well represented in cash-financed transactions, but were under-represented 
in transactions financed with mortgage loans. In 2002, however, women were involved 
in 50 per cent of all transactions co-fmanced with LRAD grants and mortgage loans. This 
3 A corporate owner is a juristic entity representing the interests of one or more people. 
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may explain why the quality of land acquired by women in 2002 was higher than in 
previous census surveys (R4,3811 ha versus R3,040lha). This also suggests that LRAD 
targeted women much more effectively than did the SLAG programme and could 
improve women's access to mortgage loans in the future. 
Table 4: Distribution ofland transactions by gender in KwaZulu-Natal, 1997-2002 
Male Female owners Corporate 
owners or married co-owners owners 
Cases 412 478 269 
Grant only (%) 0 0 100 
Private cash (%) 43 36 21 
Private bond (%) 49 29 22 
Mortgage loan Qlus LRAD -.9'"ant~%l 43 50 7 
Private non-market (%) 32 65 3 
IAII transactions (%) 36 41 23 
Table 5 shows that the total area of farmland acquired solely by men during 1997-2002 
was higher than that acquired by women as sole owners or married co-owners (35,356 
versus 25,615 hectares). Farms acquired by women were also, ~ average, smaller (53 
hectares) than those acquired by their male counterparts (86 he~tares) largely because the 
areas inherited by women tended to be relatively small. Eigure7 shows that with the 
.. , 
exception of 1997 and 1999, men purchased almost twice the total area, purchased by 
~ 
women. Overall, corporate entrants acquired more land than males and females combined 
over the six-year study period. In 2002, corporate entities accounted for 85 per cent of the 
farmland transferred to previously disadvantaged South Africans 'ih KwaZulu-Natal. 
The gender representation of these corporate entities is not known but it seems likely that 
they favour men. This is certainly true of the Community Land Trusts and Communal 
Property Associations established by government to represent the interests of 
beneficiaries that pooled their SLAG grants to purchase land collectively (DLA, 2001). 
That these groups were primarily interested in maximizing land area for residential and 
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grazing purposes is evidenced by the poor quality of land purchased by corporate entities 
(RI223/ha) compared to that purchased by men only (R2534/ha) and women as owners 
or married co-owners (R3049/ha). 
Table 5: Farmland characteristics by gender in KwaZulu-Natal, 1997-2002 (constant 
2000 prices) 
Male Female owners Corporate 
Farm characteristics owners or married co-owners owners 
Mean area of farms (Ha) 86 53 434 
n = 412 n = 478 n = 269 
trotal area of land (Ha) 35356 25615 116696 
n = 412 n =478 n = 269 
jrotal market value of purchased land (R 
million) 80 55,91 137,73 
n =283 n = 215 n =255 
rvveighted land price (RI Ha) 2534 3049 1223 
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Figure 7: Total area of farmland transacted by category of disadvantaged owners III 
KwaZulu-Natal, 1997-2002 
Farm worker equity-sharing schemes could help correct the gender imbalance as women 
are usually well represented amongst faIm workers. Despite the success of these projects 
in other parts of the country such schemes have not yet taken hold in KwaZulu-Natal. No 
grant funded equity-sharing schemes were known to be operating in the Province during 
the study period (Lyne, 2003). 
CHAPTER 3 
DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS OF MARKET MODES OF LAND 
REDISTRIBUTION 
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A linear discriminant model was estimated to identify farm and gender characteristics 
associated with three different market modes of land redistribution (transactions financed 
with government grants, own cash or mortgage loans) using data drawn from the 
'advantaged to disadvantaged' subset of the deeds of transfer recorded in KwaZulu-Natal 
from 1997 to 2002 (Appendix 2). Parameters showing the relative strength and direction 
(positive or negative) of partial relationships estimated for these characteristics shed light 
on the performance of each mode of land redistribution. 
3.1 The data 
The following variables were considered in this analysis: 
MODE OF LAND REDISTRIBUTION: As noted in section 2.1 the transfer deeds do not 
explicitly record the mode of redistribution except for non-market transactions and those 
financed with mortgage loans. Transactions involving farms purchased by a Communal 
Property Association or Community Land Trust were financed only with government 
grants. Transactions co-financed with LRAD grants and mortgage loans were identified 
from lists provided by the lenders (Land Bank and Ithala Development Finance 
Corporation). The remaining market transactions were classified as own cash 
transactions. 
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Of the 1167 transactions that redistributed farmland to previously disadvantaged South 
Africans in KwaZulu-Natal during 1997-2002, 459 cases were excluded as they were 
non-market transfers. The remaining 708 transactions were categorised as; government 
grant only (n = 135), mortgage loan (n=200), mortgage loan plus LRAD grant (n=14) and 
own cash (n=359), The 'mortgage loan plus LRAD grant' transactions were then 
combined with the mortgage loan group because the former share the characteristics of 
private transactions co-financed with mortgage loans and own equity as they are assessed 
by commercial banks. 
AREA: Hectares of land purchased by the new owner. 
QUALITY: The quality of farmland purchased by the new owner was estimated by the 
price paid per hectare on the assumption that market prices accurately reflect the land's 
earning potential (Standard Bank, 1999:37-40). 
REGION: Following Lyne & Ortmann (1996), KwaZulu-Natal was divided into three 
geographic zones, namely; the Coastal Belt, Midlands and Lowveld. The Lowveld 
accounts for a small part of the province and is typically located in river valleys that are 
remote from towns. Each observed market transaction was then allocated to one of these 
zones using location codes recorded on the transfer deed. 
GENDER: The transfer deeds do not record the gender of new landowners. In the 
absence of this information, the gender of buyers who were natural persons was 
established primarily on the basis of their names. As noted in section 2.1, this process is 
not entirely accurate for sole owners. However, in the case of married co-owners, the 
names of both the husband and wife are recorded. 
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3.2 Linear discriminant analysis (LDA) 
LDA is a statistical technique used to distinguish between two or more groups using 
characteristics on which the groups are expected to differ (Manly, 1994: 107). Groups are 
forced to be as statistically different as possible by fonning a weighted linear 
combination of the discriminating variables (SPSS, 1994). The weights are estimated so 
that they result in the 'best' separation between the groups. 
A linear discriminant function can be represented as: 
Di = ~\ Zi\ + ~2 Zi2 + .. .... ............ .. .. + ~pZip 
Where; 
Di is the score of the discriminant function for the ith respondent, 
~p are the standardised weights or coefficients to be estimated, 
Zip are the standardised values of the p discriminating variables. 
The standardised weighting coefficients (~p) reflect the relative importance of each 
discriminating variable (Zip). Variables with relatively larger ~p contribute more to the 
discrimination of groups. Two statistics are commonly used to gauge the importance of a 
discriminant function. The first is Wilks' Lambda, an inverse measure of the function's 
discriminating power; the smaller the value of Wilks' Lambda the better the 
discriminating power of the function. The second is the correct classification rate. This 
shows how well the discriminant model predicts the actual group membership of the 
original observations. For a three-group study like this, only two discriminant functions 
can be extracted - with the first function accounting for the largest proportion of the 
differences among the three groups. Table 6 summarises the discriminating variables 
included in the analysis. 
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.. I~ aturallo~ of ~arm size measured in hectares ~.~~~~~~ 
lQuality of farmland measured as the natural log of price paid per hectare 
'(R/Ha) in constant 2000 Rands 
Dummy variable scoring one if the farm purchased falls within the 
("'olldlll Rplt or zero iflocated in the Midlands or Lowveld 
,Dummy variable scoring one if the farm purchased falls within the 
ilM'iill'ands and zero if located in the Coastal Belt or Lowveld 
:IDummy variable scoring one if the new owner is a corporate entity and 
lzero if a natural person or married couple 
F='"""=~~~"""""""""~~"~~.""'""""=.-"~=""~"=="~~"~~~="===~~"""~"~~==""="""="~"==~~ ... . -.... "=="=--"" 
I(D22) !Dummy variable scoring one if the new owner is a male and zero if a 
'1corporat~entit)'()r woman as either sole owner or married co-owner 
LN(AREA): Farms financed with government grants are expected to be larger in area 
than those financed with mortgage loans or own cash. Beneficiaries of the SLAG 
programme tended to purchase extensive but low quality farms because their main 
objective was to accommodate the residential and grazing needs of a large group of 
households by pooling their small grants (Turner & Ibsen, 2000: 10-11). Farms purchased 
with own cash are expected to be amongst the smallest as few people, especially the 
previously disadvantaged, have sufficient savings to pay cash for a large farm. Low 
levels of equity capital are also expected to constrain the size of farms financed with 
mortgage loans because commercial banks usually require a debt/equity ratio of less than 
one. The variable AREA was transformed to natural logarithms to reduce skewness in its 
distribution. 
LN(QUALITY): Farmland purchased with mortgage loans or own cash is expected to be 
of higher agricultural quality than land financed only from government grants - partly 
because groups of SLAG beneficiaries required large areas for residential and grazing 
purposes and partly because co-ownership of more expensive crop land created social 
problems in its allocation to beneficiaries, or free-rider problems in its collective use 
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(Lyne & Graham, 2001). The variable QUALITY - measured in terms of real price paid 
per hectare - was also transformed to natural logarithms to improve the symmetry of its 
distribution. 
REGION: Regional dummies were included to capture bias in the location of public and 
private land redistribution programmes. For example, it is well documented that the 
SLAG programme was piloted in the Midlands and Lowveld of KwaZulu-Natal near the 
towns of Estcourt and Weenen owing to conflict between commercial farmers and labour 
tenants, and that the medium-scale sugar-cane farmer programme subsidised by private 
sugar millers is located in the Coastal Belt (Graham, 2000). Two regional dummy 
variables (DJJ and DJ2) were included in the analysis to distinguish transactions in the 
Coastal and Midlands regions from those in the Lowveld - the default category. 
GENDER: Two 'gender' dummies account for three categories of owner. Dummy 
variable D2J scores a one if the buyer is a corporate entity, and zero otherwise. D22 scores 
a one if the buyer is a male as sole owner, and zero otherwise. The default category is 
therefore comprised of women as sole owners or married co-owners. The incidence of 
corporate ownership is expected to be highest for farms financed only from government 
grants. Under the SLAG programme, beneficiaries had to pool their small grants and 
purchase farms collectively in order to avoid the high costs of surveying and registering 
subdivisions. However, the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act, Act 70 of 1970, 
prohibits co-ownership of farmland in undivided shares by natural persons other than 
husband and wife. Consequently, each beneficiary group had to establish a juristic entity, 
usually a Communal Property Association or a Community Land Trust, to take 
ownership of the land. According to the DLA (2001) women are under-represented in 
these corporate entities. For farms financed with own cash or mortgage loans, the 
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incidence of female ownership is expected to be relatively low as previously 
disadvantaged women typically lack savings and creditworthiness as a result of 
discriminatory customs and social practices (DLA, 1997a). In addition, the contractual 
status of women married under customary law before 1998 was limited to a legal state of 
perpetual minority. Under the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act, Act 120 of 
1998, a customary marriage entrenches equality and, unless stated in an ante-nuptial 
contract, is a marriage in community of property (DHA, 2000). 
3.3 Results 
The descriptive statistics presented in Table 7 show significant univariate differences in 
the mean values of all the discriminating variables. The direction of these differences is 
consistent with a priori expectations. 
Table 7: Mean farm and gender characteristics by mode of redistribution in KwaZulu-
Natal, 1997-2002 
Variable Own cash Mortgage including Government grant F-value 
mortgage +LRAD only 
Cases (333) (210) (129) 
LN(AREA) 3.41 4.48 5.62 93.90*** 
LN(QUALITY) 7.81 8.59 6.71 86.41*** 
D\\ 0.39 0.37 0.25 6.06*** 
DI2 0.54 0.49 0.72 9.23*** 
D21 0.22 0.21 1.00 233.87*** 
D22 0.47 0.50 0.00 60.18*** ... . 
Impbes SIgnIficance at the one per cent level of probability 
Discriminant functions were estimated with SPSS vl1.5 (2002) usmg a stepwise 
procedure that entered explanatory variables only if they were statistically significant at 
the 20 per cent level of probability or better. Collinearity between discriminating 
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variables did not appear to be a problem as the lowest tolerance level for any of the 
variables was 0.74. 
Results of the analysis are presented in Table 8. Function 1 accounts for 68 per cent of 
the differences among the three modes of redistribution, while Function 2 accounts for 32 
per cent. Wilk's Lamda is statistically significant for both functions. Together, these 
functions reduce Wilk's Lamba to 0.37 and correctly classify 71 per cent of transactions 
financed with own cash, 71 per cent of transactions financed with mortgage loans, and 92 
per cent of farms purchased with government grants when prior probabilities of group 
membership are set equal to group size. The overall rate of correct classification is 75 per 
cent, indicating that a considerable amount of discriminatory information is accounted for 
by the explanatory variables. 
Table 8: Estimated discriminant functions and group means distinguishing three different 
modes ofland redistribution, 1997-2002 
Discriminating Standardised 
Variable Coefficients Mode of land redistribution Group centroids 
Function 1 Function 2 Function 1 Function 2 
'pre 2000' '2000' 'pre 2000' '2000' 
/LN (QUALITY) 0.71 .* 0.89*** Mortgage including LRAD + 0.90 0.74 
mortgage 
ILN(AREA) 0.42*** 1.17*** 
1011 -0.15 -0.28 Government grant only -1.81 0.47 
1012 -0.11 -0.37 
D2J -0.91 *** 0.14*** Own cash 0.14 -0.65 
% of variance 68.00 32.00 
Wilks' Lambda 0.53*** 0.70*** 
*** . Imphes sIgmficance at the one per cent level of probability. 
According to the magnitude and signs of the standardised coefficients estimated for 
significant variables in the first discriminant function, it is clear that larger farms of better 
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quality tend to be purchased by individual owners rather than by groups registered as a 
corporate entity. The group centroids suggest that this function distinguishes farms 
financed with government grants from those financed with mortgage loans or (to a lesser 
extent) cash reserves over the period 1997-2001 when the SLAG programme discouraged 
private investment by creating models of collective ownership that did not establish 
conditions for efficient land use or creditworthiness (Lyne & Graham, 2001; Graham & 
Darroch, 2001). 
The significant coefficients estimated for Function 2 show a strengthening of the positive 
relationship between farm size and quality, and a weak positive relationship with 
corporate ownership. In this case, the group centroids suggest that Function 2 is 
characterised mainly by transactions in 2002 when SLAG was replaced by LRAD. Under 
LRAD, corporate ownership tends to be characterised by small groups (of family 
members) with benefit rights proportional to individual investment rather than large 
groups of land reform beneficiaries with equal rights to use the land. A narrowing of the 
gap between the centroids predicted for loan and grant financed transactions suggests that 
LRAD beneficiaries who did not raise mortgage loans might have invested substantial 
savings of their own to purchase larger and better quality farms. This outcome was 
unlikely under SLAG owing to the means test and free-rider problems created by the type 
of collective action that SLAG entrenched. 
Interestingly, there is no significant relationship between mode of redistribution and the 
gender of natural persons who used their own cash or mortgage loans to finance family 
farms. Also there appears to be no significant relationship between geographic location 
and mode redistribution, but this might be due to inadequate measures of location that do 
not accurately capture differences in access to grant and loan finance. 
CHAPTER 4 
REVERSE LAND TRANSFERS 
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For the first time during the 1997 - 2002 study period, the 2002 KwaZulu-Natal farmland 
census study identified and analysed reverse land transfer, where land transferred from 
previously disadvantaged individuals to historically more advantaged ones (Appendix 3). 
As noted in section 2.1, the disadvantaged group consists of those people who were 
excluded from land markets on the basis of racial and- to some extent- gender segregation 
before 1994, while the advantaged group comprises of persons (natural and juristic) that 
had the right to transact in land prior to 1994. Of the 316,840 hectares of farmland 
transacted in KwaZulu-Natal during 2002, 1,454 hectares or 0.46 per cent was transferred 
from previously disadvantaged individuals to historically advantaged ones. This is small 
compared to redistributive transfers that transferred about 38 times more land (56,411 
hectares) to previously disadvantaged individuals in 2002. Evidence of the existence of a 
secondary market for redistributed land is a healthy sign, as land wealth and its collateral 
value would disappear in the absence of a land market. 
The characteristics of reverse land transfers are shown in Table 9. Of the 51 transactions 
that transferred farmland from disadvantaged to advantaged individuals, 17 were non-
market transfers. Of the 34 market transactions the majority (25 transactions) were 
financed with cash, while mortgage loans financed five transactions. Overall the market 
transactions involved small farms averaging 36 hectares in area whereas redistributive 
transfers recorded in 2002 averaged 229 hectares. This suggests that some new entrants 
sold portions of their farms perhaps to generate liquidity. 
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Table 9: Characteristics of farmland transfers from disadvantaged owners to advantaged 




characteristic loan Total 
5 29 51 




No land was transferred from government land reform beneficiaries to previously 
advantaged people. This is not unexpected because the group settlement schemes under 
the SLAG programme prior to 2002 effectively removed land from the market. 
According to Lyne & Graham (2001), it is unlikely that farms acquired by large user 
groups (as in the case of SLAG projects) can command either a market value or collateral 




CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The annual census surveys of fannland transfers show that about 56,411 hectares of the 
total commercial farmland transferred to new owners during 2002 in KwaZulu-Natal was 
transferred to previously disadvantaged South Africans. This represents 1.06 per cent of 
the farmland originally available for redistribution in 1994, the highest annual rate of land 
redistribution estimated for the Province since 1997 when the first survey was conducted. 
The improvement in the rate of redistribution could possibly be due to the launch of 
LRAD under which the authority to approve and implement land reform projects was 
decentralized from the national DLA to provincial departments, which shortened the 
decision chain reducing lengthy delays that hampered the SLAG programme. The 
increase in the rate of redistribution during 2002 may also be due to a backlog of SLAG-
assisted transfers being processed during 2002 after a two-year moratorium. 
The study also shows that during 2002, transactions financed only with government 
grants redistributed more land than private purchases (32,028 hectares versus 22,863 
hectares). In addition, land wealth transferred to previously disadvantaged households 
through these grant transactions increased from 17 per cent during 1997-2001 to about 24 
per cent in 2002. With regards to the performance of the three market modes of land 
redistribution, the results show that land transactions co-financed by private sector 
financial institutions transferred larger fanns of better quality to emerging farmers than 
those financed solely from own cash or government grants. The results further indicate 
that the gap between land transfers financed by the private sector and those financed by 
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government grants narrowed considerably following the introduction of LRAD. This 
suggests that LRAD beneficiaries who did not raise mortgage loans might have invested 
substantial savings of their own in order to purchase larger, better quality farms. This was 
unlikely under SLAG due to the means test and free-rider problems created by group 
ownership that SLAG entrenched. 
Early findings indicate that LRAD has succeeded in leveraging private resources to co-
finance land reform beneficiaries that purchased their own, high quality farms. These 
public-private partnerships in financing land have been boosted by the recapitalisation of 
the LREF. Extending the privilege of approving LRAD grants for eligible clients whose 
loan applications have been assessed and found creditworthy by other banks other than 
the Land Bank could further enhance these public-private partnerships. 
Initial results indicate that farms acquired under the SLAG programme were smaller and 
of much poorer quality than those acquired by beneficiaries under LRAD. The relative 
failure of SLAG in terms of transferring larger farms of better quality two likely causes 
two. First, the SLAG programme specifically targeted the relatively poor who did not 
have substantial savings of their own with which to co-finance farmland purchase. 
Second, the programme promoted models of collective farm ownership that entrenched 
free-rider problems, and consequently did not establish conditions for effective land use 
or creditworthiness. LRAD, by contrast, offers larger grants to wealthier farmers and is 
therefore more conducive to the establishment of individually-owned farms or enterprises 
owned by a small group of individuals. 
Considering gender issues, women as sole owners or married co-owners accounted for 
the largest share (41 per cent) of all transactions during 1997-2002, largely because 
bequests favour women. Also, women are well represented in transactions co-financed 
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with LRAD grants and mortgage loans. This suggests that LRAD has been more 
successful in engaging women in land redistribution than was the SLAG programme 
during 1997-2001. Nevertheless, previously disadvantaged women gained less land than 
their male counterparts (25,615 versus 35,356 hectares) and, after removing non-market 
transactions, they gained much less land wealth compared to their male counterparts (R56 
million versus R80 million). Policies and programmes that encourage the establishment 
of farmworker equity sharing schemes in KwaZulu-Natal could help correct the gender 
imbalance as women are usually well represented amongst farmworkers. While the 
results from discriminant analysis show no apparent gender bias in the use of cash or 
private mortgage loans to finance family farms, there is concern that women are under-
represented in land transactions involving corporate buyers. 
Replacing the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act, Act 70 of 1970, with zomng 
regulations could increase the supply of smaller, more affordable properties for individual 
emergent farmers. Lyne and Darroch (2003) argue that this Act constrains the subdivision 
of farms into smaller parcels of land, preventing many emerging farmers from making 
private purchases. Although grant financed transactions can be exempted from the Act, 
costs associated with formal subdivision of agricultural land are prohibitively high. 
Besides, the exemption pertains only to government-assisted transfers and therefore does 
nothing to increase market access for private buyers. 
The study found that a small part of farmland (0.5 per cent) transacted during 2002 in 
KwaZulu-Natal, transferred from previously disadvantaged individuals to historically 
advantaged ones. The existence of a secondary land market for redistributed land is a 
positive sign as the absence of a land market would diminish the market value (land 
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wealth) and collateral value of redistributed land as was the case with group settlement 
schemes under SLAG programme. However, while low levels of reverse transfers should 
be tolerated, should rates of reverse transfer rise significantly, it would be necessary to 
identify and address the underlying causes (eg. liquidity problems) rather than intervene 
in the market. Future research should ascertain whether improvements in the rate of land 
redistribution in KwaZulu-Natal during 2002 will be sustained in the future, and 
determine the extent to which these improvements could be attributed to the LRAD 
programme. It is also recommended that research should be conducted to compare the 




As a result of the racist Natives Land Act of 1913, South Africa has a highly skewed land 
distribution with the white minority owning most of the agricultural land. Since 
democratisation in 1994 government and private modes of land redistribution have 
emerged to redistribute farmland to previously disadvantaged people. This study aimed at 
determining the performance of the LRAD programme relative to private transactions in 
KwaZulu-Natal during 2002 and contrasting the results with those of the earlier SLAG 
programme. The study also examined the performance of different market modes during 
1997-2002 as well as the extent of reverse land transfers identified in the 2002 land 
transactions. 
Early indications are that the LRAD programme had a dramatic impact on land 
redistribution during 2002 in K waZulu-Natal. The rate of land redistribution doubled and 
for the first time since 1997 when the surveys commenced, transactions financed solely 
from government grants redistributed more land than did privately financed transactions. 
The study also shows that the LRAD programme is more successful in attracting women 
in land redistribution than was the SLAG programme. Under the SLAG programme 
during 1997-2001, previously disadvantaged women not only gained less land than their 
male counterparts they also gained less land wealth. In contrast fifty per cent of the 
transactions co-financed with LRAD grants and mortgage loans in KwaZu1u-Nata1 during 
2002 involved female buyers as owners or married co-owners. However, there is concern 
that women are not well represented in corporate entities. Farm worker equity-sharing 
schemes could help reduce this imbalance as women are well represented amongst farm 
workers. 
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Findings show that LRAD has also assisted in engaging financial institutions III co-
financing previously disadvantaged entrants to purchase their own, high quality fanns. 
Fourteen transactions were financed with a combination of LRAD and mortgage finance 
in 2002. The quality of land transferred using this mode of redistribution was greater than 
that fmanced solely with government grants and privately. One of the major barriers to 
these private-public partnerships in financing land redistribution is the shortage of grant 
funds. This shortage has arisen because the Land Bank, which enjoys the privilege of 
being the only bank pennitted to approve LRAD applications, has not processed many 
deals for which it approved grants. Allowing banks other than the Land Bank, to approve 
LRAD grants for clients whose loan applications have been assessed and found credit 
worthy could enhance these public-private partnerships. 
Discriminant analysis was used to establish the performance of the different modes of 
redistribution observed in KwaZulu-Natal over the period 1997-2002. The results show 
that the gap between land transfers financed by the private sector and those financed by 
government grants narrowed considerably following the introduction of the LRAD 
programme. The results also indicate that land transactions co-financed by commercial 
banks transferred larger fanns of better quality to previously disadvantaged South 
Africans relative to those financed exclusively by own cash or government grants. A 
small portion of fannland (1,454 ha) of previously redistributed farmland transferred 
back to previously advantaged individuals. Such transactions were not detected before 
2002 suggesting the onset of a trend worth monitoring to identify the underlying reasons 
for these transactions. 
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APPENDICES 














= I if buyer is female, and 0 otherwise 
=1 if bought by husband & wife, and 0 otherwise 
= 1 if financed with SLAG or LRAD grant but no loan 
finance, 0 otherwise 
= 1 if financed with mortgage loan, 0 otherwise 
= 1 if financed privately with cash, 0 otherwise 
= I if transfer was a non-market transfer, 0 otherwise 
= 1 if financed with mortgage loan plus LRAD grant, 0 
otherwise 
Market price paid for land (R) 
Mortgage loan amount used to buy land (R) 
Farm size (Ha) 
-1 
FEMALE JOINT GRANT MORTGAGE CASH INHERIT MORT -GRANT PRICE BOND AREA 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 195000 0 16.71 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 450000 250000 19.41 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 110000 60000 20.23 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 205000 0 20.80 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 55000 0 21.71 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 205000 205000 29.75 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 16500 0 30.80 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 98000 0 31.99 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 60000 0 46.88 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 46546 0 51.72 
0 0 0 0 0 0 37200 0 62.22 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 32000 0 66.95 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 12000001400000 69.65 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2000000 2000000 80.80 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 75000 0 84.86 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 47500 0 96.73 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 400000 400000 100.50 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 70400 0 115.83 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 94266 0 118.40 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 104292 0 139.56 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 12400001000000 163.67 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 145000 350000 192.04 
0 0 0 0 0 0 3000000 150000 202.34 
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Appendix 1: Continued 
FEMALE JOINT GRANT MORTGAGE CASH INHERIT MORT-GRANT PRICE BOND AREA 










































































































































































































































































































































450000 450000 223.74 
180000 0 242.10 
375000 0 249.19 
189668 0 270.95 
221400 0 276.15 
184000 0 313.47 
163508 0 327.17 
150000 0 335.41 
180000 0 373.44 
900000 1210002 398.52 
230000 155000 415.46 
210141 0 420.28 
194750 0 490.28 
205000 0 554.82 
700000 1300000 573.73 
300000 0 600.64 
335000 0 629.29 
947642 0 631.76 
775000 0 651 .63 
425000 0 655.64 
o 755.67 
578224 0 798.65 
342000 0 912.91 
328274 0 937.68 
732028 0 953.86 
788110 0 1025.88 
530400 0 1108.80 
1897724 0 1265.15 
934514 0 1354.93 
1209804 0 1444.26 
795600 0 1673.06 
1570058 0 2044.59 





30000 0 2.05 
48000 0 2.12 
150000 0 5.56 
20000 0 6.23 
35000 0 6.76 
50000 0 7.21 
155000 0 8.19 
55000 0 8.24 
130000 0 9.14 
43693 0 9.93 
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Appendix 1: Continued 
FEMALE JOINT GRANT MORTGAGE CASH INHERIT MORT-GRANT PRICE BOND AREA 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix 1: Continued 
FEMALE JOINT GRANT MORTGAGE CASH INHERIT MORT-GRANT PRICE BOND AREA 
o 0 0 0 1 0 0 1520000 0 1435.93 
o 1 0 0 0 0 1 380000 392000 38.45 
o 0 0 0 0 0 1 550000 310000 61 .64 
o 0 0 0 0 0 1 1068403 712902 145.61 
o 1 0 0 0 0 1 938997 621548 155.02 
o 0 0 0 0 0 1 1271891 825082 155.46 
o 0 0 0 0 0 1 1032465 649629 159.11 
o 1 0 0 0 0 1 1268818 826911 167.99 
o 0 0 0 0 0 1 2000000 960000 203.96 
o 1 0 0 0 0 1 1239337 817861 259.25 
o 0 0 0 0 0 1 1373438 896049 460.49 
o 0 0 0 0 0 1 1919512 801796 1108.41 
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 -1 3000 5.67 
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 85000 85000 24.54 
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 310000 107500 38.94 
1 0 0 0 0 0 715000 669750 72.30 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1.21 










































































































































































































































































Appendix 1: Continued 
FEMALE JOINT GRANT MORTGAGE CASH INHERIT MORT -GRANT PRICE BOND AREA 
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 160875 0 208.85 
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 250000 0 323.74 
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1181251 797963 136.02 
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1211688 804330 146.90 
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1096319 687941 206.01 
Appendix 2: Fann and gender characteristics of fannland acquired by disadvantaged 














Mode of land redistribution except non-market transactions 
= 1 if land purchase was financed with own cash. 
=2 if land purchase was fmanced with either mortgage loan or 
mortgage loan plus LRAD grant. 
=3 if land purchase was financed with government grant without 
loan finance. 
Corporate entity = 1 if buyer is a corporate entity, 0 if male or 
female. 
= 1 if buyer is female or married co-owner, 0 if male or corporate 
entity. 
= 1 if buyer is male, 0 if female or married co-owner or corporate 
entity. 
Fann size measured in hectares 
Quality of fannland measured as price paid per hectare (RlHa) in 
constant 2000 Rands. 
= I if land purchased lies in the Coastal Belt, 0 if located in 
Midlands or Lowveld. 
= I if land purchased is located in the Midlands, 0 if located in 
Coastal Belt or lowveld. 
= 1 if land purchased is located in the Lowveld, 0 if located in 
Coastal Belt or Midlands. 
-I 
MODE CE FEMALE MALE AREA R QUALITY COASTAL MIDLANDS LOWVELD 
1 0 0 1 2.28 4175.44 -1 -1 -1 
1 0 0 1 10.73 2218.08 -1 -1 -1 
1 0 0 1 10.80 14324.07 -1 -1 -1 
2 0 0 1 6.28 13266.44 -1 -1 -1 
Appendix 2: Continued 

































































































































































































R QUALITY COASTAL MIDLANDS LOWVELD 
12496.91 -1 -1 -1 

























































































































































































Appendix 2: Continued 
MODE CE FEMALE MALE AREA R QUALITY COASTAL MIDLANDS LOWVELD 









































































































































































































246.53 580.05 ' 

















































































































































































Appendix 2: Continued 































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix 2: Continued 
MODE CE FEMALE MALE AREA R QUALITY COASTAL MIDLANDS LOWVELD 













































































































































1 105.2909 10244.95 
1 150.6014 3787.48 
1 171.1719 537.47 
1 181.6533 1198.41 
1 217.1422 2542.11 
1 312.1992 6876.71 
1 480.5537 918.94 
1 526.2864 734.20 
1 20.23 4675.23 
1 29.75 5925.87 
1 69.65 14817.37 
1 . 13.94 7682.93 
1 19.05 6871.39 















































































































































































































































Appendix 2: Continued 
MODE CE FEMALE MALE AREA R QUALITY COASTAL MIDLANDS LOWVELD 

























































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix 2: Continued 
MODE CE FEMALE MALE AREA R QUALITY COASTAL MIDLANDS LOWVELD 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix 2: Continued 

































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix 2: Continued 



















































































































































































































































R QUALITY COASTAL MIDLANDS LOWVELD 





























































































































































































Appendix 2: Continued 








































































































































































































R QUALITY COASTAL MIDLANDS LOWVELD 































































































































































































Appendix 2: Continued 





































































































































































































R QUALITY COASTAL MIDLANDS LOWVELD 
9185.25 
3677.38 































































































































































































Appendix 2: Continued 
MODE CE FEMALE MALE AREA R QUALITY COASTAL MIDLANDS LOWVELD 
1 0 1 0 13.18 4097.55 0 1 0 









































































































































































































85.504 271 .15 
161.8737 909.35 
243.6491 453.11 






































































































































































Appendix 2: Continued 













































































































































































































27.11 7901 .14 
27.44 7806.12 
27.56 2374.82 

















































































































































































Appendix 2: Continued 



































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix 2: Continued 




















































































































































R QUALITY COASTAL MIDLANDS LOWVELD 




































180.995 . 762.45 
207.759 442.82 
























































































































































Appendix 2: Continued 
MODE CE FEMALE MALE AREA RQUALlTY COASTAL MIDLANDS LOWVELD 
3 1 0 647.8285 264.57 0 1 0 
3 1 0 669.7955 598.00 0 1 0 
3 1 0 689.1031 961 .25 0 1 0 
3 1 0 755.883 742.44 0 1 0 
3 1 0 847.4327 455.97 0 1 0 
3 1 0 1151.3502 759.11 0 1 0 
3 1 0 1529.749 300.70 0 1 0 
3 1 0 112.53 951.75 1 0 0 
3 1 0 118.22 2365.50 1 0 0 
3 1 0 132.47 538.99 1 0 0 
3 1 0 151.43 707.26 1 0 0 
3 1 0 202.34 1676.14 1 0 0 
3 1 0 202.34 1676.14 1 0 0 
3 1 0 202.34 1676.14 1 0 0 
3 1 0 202.34 1676.14 1 0 0 
3 1 0 328.91 2894.41 1 0 0 
3 1 0 334.39 427.05 1 0 0 
3 1 0 362.19 357.80 1 0 0 
3 1 0 439.87 925.23 1 0 0 
3 1 0 566.33 1575.94 1 0 0 
3 1 0 613.76 1987.34 1 0 0 
3 1 0 927.63 1218.70 1 0 0 
3 1 0 1212.03 1963.65 1 0 0 
3 1 0 1214.06 1960.36 1 0 0 
3 1 0 1230.65 925.39 1 0 0 
3 1 0 1274.76 1867.02 1 0 0 
3 1 0 2192.48 426.07 1 0 0 
3 1 0 3.28 19667.67 1 0 0 
3 1 0 4.40 19539.77 1 0 0 
3 1 0 8.12 10289.94 1 0 0 
3 1 0 8.12 10341.64 1 0 0 
3 1 0 18.79 558.96 1 0 0 











































= 1 if financed with mortgage loan, 0 otherwise 
=1 iffinanced'privately with cash, 0 otherwise 
= 1 if transfer was a non-market transfer, 0 otherwise 
Market price paid for land (R) 









































































Appendix 3: Continued 
MORTGAGE CASH INHERIT PRICE AREA 
0 1 0 145000 19.04 
0 1 0 368590 20.23 
0 1 0 200000 20.27 
0 1 0 50000 22.81 
0 1 0 185000 22.89 
0 0 1 0 24.31 
0 0 1 0 26.72 
0 1 0 50000 28.05 
0 0 1 0 29.39 
0 1 0 15000 34.16 
1 0 0 60000 38.11 
1 0 0 108000 42.37 
0 1 0 300000 74.74 
0 0 1 0 75.29 
0 1 0 350000 161.87 
1 0 0 250000 167.28 
0 1 0 1250000 419.53 
